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Globalization and the Scrambling Process 
of Catching Up in Mexico
Clemente Ruiz Durán
In the last 50 years, Mexico’s manufacturing growth has been 
fostered, although its competitiveness has relied on the low wage 
paradigm. In this article, the country’s immersion in globalization 
is analyzed, thereby departing from the effects derived by the oil 
crisis that forced the country to leave the trap of natural resources 
to generate productive value chains through the economic opening 
boosted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and subsequently, by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Such economic opening allowed the development of 
global value chains through original equipment manufacturing in 
the automotive, electronics, pharmaceutical, and medical devices 
industries. However, this process has been characterized by low 
investment coefficients and scarce innovation compared with Korea, 
Malaysia and China, due to the lack of an institutional framework 
that could have promoted innovation to allow the country to 
overcome the middle-income trap.
Keywords:  Industrial policy, Global Value Chains, Catch-up, 
Mexico
JEL Classification: L00, F43, F6
84 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
I. Introduction 
During the last 50 years, manufacturing value added in Mexico has 
multiplied almost by four times, keeping its rank among industrial 
countries. However, it has not been able to close the gap with large 
industrial economies like the United States. In 1970, Mexico’s share in 
the US manufacturing output was 6%. Today it is only 10%. Hence, it 
could be argued that the catch-up process in Mexico has been slow and 
erratic.
However, there is a need to explain why the rising share of Mexico 
in exports (from 0.4% of world exports in 1970 to 2.4% 2017, reaching 
USD409,404 million) is not that far from the USD573,694 million 
generated by Korea, where the catch up process has allowed its 
manufacturing value added per capita to reach USD7,295 dollars, 
which is considerable above the US value of USD6,064. 
This paper argues that Mexico, in the aftermath of the debt crisis, 
developed a large export platform but with low linkages with the rest 
of the economy, though it increased industrial capacity in the country. 
This move has promoted regional development in the country, which in 
turn, led to a redesign of the economic geography.
II. Getting out of the Trap of Natural Resources 
In the 1970s, in the aftermath of the oil crisis, Mexico pushed oil 
exploration and extraction to finance the operation wherein the Federal 
Government contracted large volumes of debt under the assumption 
of high prices of oil. Unfortunately, this never happened due to the 
opening of alternative sources of oil in different countries in Asia (South 
East Asia) and the European North Sea, thus leading to the debt crisis 
of the early 1980s. Overcoming this situation required the establishment 
of an export platform that will not rely on raw materials, but on 
manufactured goods, to provide foreign exchange to the economy. As 
can be observed in Figure 1, manufacturing exports increased and put 
Mexico in the global value chain (GVC) ranking. At present, its oil export 
share is at 5%. 
III. Changing the Manufacturing Mix: Linking to GVCs 
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of a new manufacturing platform, one that can support an export 
expansion in a steady way. The main choice was to promote GVCs. 
Under NAFTA, the main features of Mexico’s manufacturing base 
were its location and wage differential with US and Canada. By 1997, 
the hourly compensation was of USD2.62, compared with the rates 
of USD23.04 and USD18.94 in the US and Canada, which was about 
10% and 14% of US and Canadian wages, respectively. This differential 
did not close overtime, for in 2016, hourly compensation rose to 
USD3.91, which was still 10% and 12% of wages in the US and Canada, 
respectively. In those terms, Mexico’s advantage was its stable low wage 
neighborhood within NAFTA, which was extremely attractive for many 
countries willing to export to the States through Mexico. This was the 
case for German firms to whom Mexico’s hourly compensation was 
even more attractive at just  9% of Germany’s rate. GVCs that took 
advantage of the Mexican platform were those in the transportation 
equipment manufacturing, computer and electronic product 
manufacturing, electrical equipment appliances and components, 
































































































Primary export  period
Emergence of the manufacturing export platform
Source: Own elaboration based on: OECD, Data, Trade in goods and services.
Figure 1
Mexico: getting out of the trap of natural resources
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IV.  New Manufacturing Mix with Low Investment Coefficients 
One of the main problems raised by the new manufacturing mix was 
that it was launched with low investment coefficients typical in bond 
plants, which often did not require a sophisticated network. There was 
a high reliance on foreign investors, and from 1999 to 2017, funds 
for manufacturing plants in Mexico were around USD244 thousand 
million, mainly concentrated in the transport equipment, electronics, 
computers, chemical, and beverage manufacturing industries. The 
overall investment coefficient comprised of 21% of the GDP and the 
manufacturing investment coefficient was only of 4% of the GDP.
V.  Employment and Productivity Effects of the New Manufac- 
turing Mix 
The new manufacturing platform created 1,333,744 new jobs in 
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Source:  Own elaboration based on: INEGI, System of National Accounts, Total 
Factor Productivity
Figure 2 
change in the output Mix: eMergence of transport and coMputer platforMs 
(1990–2016)
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Table 2








Manufacturing industries 4.0 244,540.2
Composition by industry 100.0 100.0
311 -  Food Manufacturing 8.4 18,967.5
312 - Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 3.4 41,768.3
313 - Textile Mills 0.7 1,257.8
314 - Textile Product Mills 0.3 1,447.1
315 - Apparel Manufacturing 0.9 2,367.8
316 - Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.4 369.5
321 - Wood Product Manufacturing 0.2 282.2
322 - Paper Manufacturing 2.4 4,495.5
323 - Printing and Related Support Activities 0.7 745.6
324 - Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 5.1 495.9
325 - Chemical Manufacturing 12.1 29,981.4
326 - Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 3.9 9,806.4
327 - Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 2.8 6,388.6
331 - Primary Metal Manufacturing 3.4 12,619.7
332 - Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 3.5 4,547.4
333 - Machinery Manufacturing 7.4 9,561.8
334 - Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 9.0 19,146.7
335 -  Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component 
Manufacturing
6.8 11,692.5
336 - Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 24.7 63,183.6
337 - Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 0.6 424.3
339 - Miscellaneous Manufacturing 3.4 4,990.6
Source:  Own estimates based on INEGI, National Accounts and Ministry of 
Economics, Deputy of Foreign Direct Investment
89Mexico’s catch process
the period 1990 to 2016, which came mainly from the transportation 
equipment manufacturing (52%) and from the computer and electronic 
product manufacturing (33%) sectors. One interesting feature in this 
process was the increase in the level of education of the manufacturing 
employees: there was a reduction in posts with basic education, a 
large increase in intermediate education posts, and a small increase in 
higher education posts hired by the transport, computer, and electronic 
product manufacturing sectors. 
When this is paired with value added, it could be observed that the 
growth of productivity per worker increased, but wages increased at a 
lower rate. Thus, it could be argued that there is paradigm of higher 
skill combined with low wage manufacturing. As Anderson and Holmes 
(1995, pp 655) point out “there is a perceived duality between high-
wage/high skill and low-wage/low skill industrial strategies underlies 
many accounts of contemporary industrial change. Within some North 
American manufacturing sectors, a hybrid strategy has taken root, 
one that combines technologically sophisticated product and process 
innovation with low-wage production”. This sort of behavior has been 
Source: Own elaboration based on: INEGI, National Accounts, Total Factor Productivity 
Figure 3 
Growth of Productivity vs Growth of Wages in Manufacturing 2003–2016. 
 
VI. Platform and Cluster Development: Creation of Innovation Ecosystems 
One of the main features of Mexico’s manufacturing restructuring was that it was led 
by different forces. On the macro level, the stimulus came through the cost 
mechanism of low wage paradox, accompanied by an improvement of the education 
levels among employees. Interestingly, the promotion of investment did not come 
from a sophisticated central office, but rather by a mix of federal and state level 
initiatives. The debt crisis pushed the federal government to promote state and local 
government support for the promotion of industrial clusters. This process became 
official with the creation of a Board of State Governors Conference (CONAGO) in 
2002, which l d to the emergence of the lanning process at the state level. 
Governors became active agents for promoting planning, and one of the main 
features was that they became responsible for developing the business environment 
an  attracting foreign inv stors into their territ y. In some cases, they were 
supported by long-term planning, for example, the State of Guanajuato had a 
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Source:  Own elaboration based on: INEGI, National Accounts, Total Factor 
Productivity
Figure 3
growth of productiVity Vs growth of wages in Manufacturing 2003–2016.
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the underlying force of free trade agreements and has also been the 
driving force of GVCs. 
VI.  Platform and Cluster Development: Creation of Innovation 
Ecosystems
One of the main features of Mexico’s manufacturing restructuring 
was that it was led by different forces. On the macro level, the 
stimulus came through the cost mechanism of low wage paradox, 
accompanied by an improvement of the education levels among 
employees. Interestingly, the promotion of investment did not come 
from a sophisticated central office, but rather by a mix of federal and 
state level initiatives. The debt crisis pushed the federal government 
to promote state and local government support for the promotion of 
industrial clusters. This process became official with the creation of 
a Board of State Governors Conference (CONAGO) in 2002, which led 
to the emergence of the planning process at the state level. Governors 
became active agents for promoting planning, and one of the main 
features was that they became responsible for developing the business 
environment and attracting foreign investors into their territory. In 
some cases, they were supported by long-term planning, for example, 
the State of Guanajuato had a strategic program up to 2040 and the 
State of Jalisco up to 2032. 
Institutional development also led to initiatives that attracted foreign 
investors through a policy of land use, which was supported by 
infrastructure development in industrial parks. Around the same time, 
businessmen created the Association of Industrial Parks (AIP), which 
hosts more than 538 parks in the country. The AIP promoted the use of 
new financial tools to promote new developments, as exemplified by the 
trust funds for industrial real estate denominated FIBRAS, and special 
funds managed by State governments. 
This policy mix led to an uneven process of promotion in the regions, 
where Federal, State and local governments became involved, with 
the participation of local businessmen to promote foreign investors 
into their territories. This sort of policy was successful in attracting 
investments in the transport equipment, computers and electronics 
devices, chemical and pharmaceutics sectors, among others. The 
whole process was developed by stages and by region. The first phase 
came in the Northern Border States where the electronics industry 
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took advantage of the Tijuana/San Diego border crossing point for 
electronics and electro domestic products. This was followed by the auto 
industry in Sonora and Chihuahua (Ford Corporation), where Chrysler 
took advantage of Nuevo León and developed the Coahuila network, 
which later combined the Daimler Benz operation and GM, in the late 
20th century. Border states led exports with a whopping 50% of the total 
exports. 
The second wave of investment came from the Western Central area, 
which aimed to push new industries. Guadalajara became the pioneer 
in the digital-electronic industries, led by IBM and Hewlett Packard, 
which promoted the digital businesses that led to creative industries 
as well as the embedded software developments linked to the auto 
industry. This attracted the Japanese to set up a Honda Plant for 
exports. Meanwhile, in the neighboring state of Aguascalientes, Nissan 
created one of the largest networks that was developed in different 
stages. At the same time, the Guanajuato area attracted Toyota, Mazda, 
and Volkswagen. Economies of scope led to the development of the 
auto parts industries in Querétaro and San Luis Potosí. In the same 
areas, apart from the development of auto industries, the Canadian 
Bombardier also set up an assembly plant, and BMW is building a very 
large facility for the new series 3 cars. Moreover, a domestic complex 
with national business was built in these areas, which later attracted to 
Samsung to set up shop in the region. All of these developments have 
led to a coprosperity area that has posted a 5% annual growth rate, well 
above the national growth level.  
The third area of clustering can be found in the traditional industries 
platform within the vicinity of Mexico City and the neighboring states, 
where the first auto industries were installed. Some of them moved up 
north, while some others refurnished their facilities, for example, Ford 
corporation transformed its Cuautitlan plant from traditional fuels 
operation to the new generation of electric cars, Nissan in Cuernavaca 
is assembling the New York City taxis, and Volkswagen and Audi 
developed new facilities in Puebla. Moreover, Mexico City has attracted 
large pharmaceutical and medical device corporations, combined with 
the development of research facilities in the University Centers of 
Mexico.
Clustering led to a density process that pushed innovations 
and interactions among regional suppliers, all of which brought in 
economies of scope at different levels and modalities. In the western 
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central area of Mexico, interactions increased among relatively medium-
sized cities, pushing for a new sort of economic development and 
giving birth to interactive cities, that instead of increasing in size, took 
advantage of economies of scope that allowed them to specialize in 
different segments of the industry. What seems interesting is that the 
clustering went beyond traditional agglomeration and brought in the 
new geography of cities that interacted with other cities. As Storper 
states, “the proximate cause of divergence and turbulence is to be 
found in changes in specialization, reflecting different levels of creating 
or absorbing innovative activities” (Storper 2018). Clustering was a 
disruptive process that required an environment of innovation. For that 
purpose, there was a demand for technical schools and universities, 
which in some cases, paved the way for the emergence of research 
centers. Some key industries took advantage of the knowledge networks 
developed, as has been the case of Mabe (an electro domestic producer), 
which decided to interact with local universities in Querétaro and San 
Luis Potosí to introduce innovations into the production line , instead of 
creating an R&D department within the company. 
University expansion followed a continuous path, as can be observed 
in Table 3. However, the links have been very loose and very few 
experiences have followed this path. In a sense, idle capacities are 
lying in the knowledge network due to the fact that the universities 
and business have been unable to take advantage of each other’s 
resources, as reflected in the low patent registration in the country. 
Agent convergence has yet to develop fully due to institutional 
problems, and there has been no guidance from the Federal, State, 
or local governments to support these linkages. Actually, there is no 
need to further expand the educational networks; what is needed is 
to initiate further interactions, which could be achieved only with a 
guidance system that could support this process. Today, the Science 
and Technology Agency (CONACYT), has no power to bring together 
academic expertise into the enterprises, and reforms are thus needed to 
push the process.
Although university networks have become the core of knowledge 
in the aforementioned regions, these have not pushed innovation 
on a large scale. The isolation of the university networks from the 
business communities is reflected in the low rate of patent registration. 
Moreover, even though Central Mexico, Border States, and Western 
Central States have larger numbers of patents, very few other entities 
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are able to register their own patents. Behind this process, there is 
also a bureaucratic problem related to the cost of patent registration. 
As pointed out by Vega González and Hernandez Jardines, “costs that 
were incurred to obtain two national patents were quite significant, but 
Table 3
eMergence of industrial aggloMerations as a source of the densification of 
Manufacturing actiVities in the territory
1986 2018 1986 2018
Border States 55 289 Western Central States 21 105
Baja California 6 92 Jalisco 6 47
Sonora 15 33 Aguascalientes 3 9
Chihuahua 11 39 Guanajuato 4 23
Coahuila de Zaragoza 7 38 Querétaro 6 13
Nuevo León 8 64 Zacatecas 2 3
Tamaulipas 8 23 San Luis Potosí 0 10
Central Mexico 23 83 Light Industrialization 
States
16 36
Ciudad de México 0 7 Colima 2 1
Edo. México 11 34 Durango 2 5
Hidalgo 5 11 Michoacán de Ocampo 2 7
Morelos 2 3 Nayarit 2 1
Puebla 4 19 Quintana Roo 2 2
Tlaxcala 1 9 Sinaloa 2 12
Yucatán 4 8
Oil States 7 17
Campeche 3 5 Southern States 5 8
Tabasco 1 3 Baja California Sur 2 1
Veracruz de Ignacio de 
la Llave
3 9 Chiapas 1 2
Guerrero 1 2
Oaxaca 1 3
Source:  Gustavo Garza (1990) Impacto regional de los parques y ciudades 
industriales, Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos.
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much more in the case of patent applications abroad, either by direct 
application or through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)” (Vega and 
Hernandez 2017). Innovation is not homogenous; there is a correlation 
between cluster development and patent registration, that is, the 
Table 4
Mexico patents registration by region
1986 2018 1986 2018
Border States 302 271 Western Central States 239 256
Baja California 18 12 Jalisco 115 118
Sonora 52 32 Aguascalientes 11 15
Chihuahua 25 42 Guanajuato 55 55
Coahuila de Zaragoza 41 38 Querétaro 46 55
Nuevo León 141 124 Zacatecas 4 5
Tamaulipas 25 23 San Luis Potosí 8 8
Central Mexico 571 657 Light Industrialization 
States
72 108
Ciudad de México 337 367 Colima 9 11
Edo. México 90 130 Durango 5 8
Hidalgo 30 37 Michoacán de Ocampo 13 21
Morelos 34 41 Nayarit 1 3
Puebla 75 80 Quintana Roo 7 11
Tlaxcala 5 2 Sinaloa 17 28
Yucatán 20 26
Oil States 25 41
Campeche 2 1 Southern States 26 26
Tabasco 8 18 Baja California Sur 4 5
Veracruz de Ignacio 
de la Llave




9 5 Oaxaca 6 10
Source:  Own estimates based on the Intellectual Property Institute of Mexico, 
Database, Investment.
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higher the business concentration, the higher the probability to register 
patents. As shown in Table 4, concentration is higher in Central Mexico, 
where 657 patents were registered in 2017, followed by the Border 
States and the Western Central States. However, the rest of the country 
has low patent registration rates. Nevertheless, some agribusiness 
firms are pushing innovation, such as in Sinaloa, where there are large 
investments in greenhouse and river development. These firms have 
registered patents for the use of algal blooms as biofuel for agricultural 
applications.
VII. Industrial Upgrading and Effects over the Economy
The input–output tables in the manufacturing sector were analyzed 
to estimate the largest multipliers effects over the economy and identify 
the manufacturing activities that have a larger effect over the economy 
within the period. As can be seen, there were larger multipliers in 
industries focused on the domestic market, namely, the food industries 
in Gross Value Production (GVP) and textile industries in employment, 
as well as lower multipliers in the export industries. 
A question that arises is as follows: If the big transformation of 
Mexico is based on the creation of an export platform, why do the 
Source: Own estimates based on INEGI, Input-Output Matriz 2013 
Figure 4 
Manufacturing Multipliers in 2013 
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Table 5
exports Value added as percentage of total production
Subsector 2003 2008 2013 2016 Average Growth 2003 to 2016
31-33 - Manufacturing Industries 10.5 11.1 11.1 13.0 1.7 
336 -  Transportation Equipment 
Manufacturing
14.1 20.9 24.4 28.3 5.5 
331 - Primary Metal Manufacturing 25.4 27.2 21.9 23.1 -0.7 
333 - Machinery Manufacturing 14.3 14.7 14.8 20.5 2.8 
335 -  Electrical Equipment, Appliance, 
and Component Manufacturing
19.7 18.4 15.1 17.5 -0.9 
339 - Miscellaneous Manufacturing 16.6 19.0 16.3 17.4 0.4 
334 -  Computer and Electronic 
Product Manufacturing
25.0 17.2 15.3 14.8 -4.0 
332 -  Fabricated Metal Product 
Manufacturing
13.6 11.5 9.0 10.7 -1.8 
315 - Apparel Manufacturing 13.0 11.8 9.1 10.1 -1.9 
326 -  Plastics and Rubber Products 
Manufacturing
8.5 8.7 7.6 8.6 0.1 
313 - Textile Mills 9.9 8.4 6.1 6.8 -2.8 
327 -  Nonmetallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing
7.8 7.3 6.6 6.5 -1.4 
314 - Textile Product Mills 3.8 4.4 4.1 6.0 3.6 
337 -  Furniture and Related Product 
Manufacturing
3.4 3.7 4.1 5.7 4.1 
325 - Chemical Manufacturing 5.4 5.4 4.2 5.3 -0.1 
312 -  Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing
3.5 4.3 4.3 4.5 2.0 
316 -  Leather and Allied Product 
Manufacturing
5.6 3.3 3.0 4.1 -2.4 
321 - Wood Product Manufacturing 4.4 4.8 2.4 2.6 -4.0 
324 -  Petroleum and Coal Products 
Manufacturing
1.6 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.5 
323 -  Printing and Related Support 
Activities
1.2 1.4 1.4 2.3 5.1 
322 - Paper Manufacturing 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.2 -2.6 
311 -  Food Manufacturing 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 -1.1 
Source:  Own estimates based on INEGI, National Accounts, Global Manufacturing 
value added in exports.
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export industries manifest bad performance in terms of employment 
and gross value of production? It could be argued that domestic 
linkages are very low. In terms of export value added, all coefficients 
are below 30%, as can be observed in Table 8, which also shows that 
the highest coefficients are in the transportation equipment, primary 
metal, and machinery manufacturing industries. The low value added 
values indicate that the export platform developed in Mexico is unable 
to capture more dynamic linkages with the rest of the economy. 
Changes in the last 13 years have been small, except in the transport 
equipment manufacturing where it has doubled in the same period, due 
to the opening of the auto parts manufacturing sector. As mentioned 
by Lee and Mathews (2012), Mexico fell into the OEM trap, without 
the possibility of moving beyond the OEM to the ODM or OBM mode 
(Lee, Szapiro, and Mao 2017).  In the Mexican case, the trap is linked 
to different factors: the free trade agreement, where US multinational 
firms blocked upgrading, a weak entrepreneurial group focused on 
rents more than upgrading manufacturing facilities, and the lack of 
institutions designed to upgrade manufacturing processes within the 
GVCs. 
VIII.  How have GVCs increased the Density of Mexican Man-
ufacturing?
The above discussion shows that GVC development has not been 
able to develop an increased value added into the economy, though 
it has provided density to the manufacturing sector in Mexico. A 
complex process of learning with large inequalities has been brought 
into the sector. This process did not follow the same patterns found in 
developing economies, rather, it has adapted to multinational patterns, 
combined with the structure of local governments, which have been 
taught  to develop tools to promote local suppliers, rather than increase 
imports from abroad. The following paragraphs include detailed 
examples of how GVCs have been able to develop linkages within 
the Mexican economy. All of the cases are dynamic and innovative: 
transportation has gone from the production of traditional vehicles 
to non-gasoline cars, the electronics industry has allowed Mexico to 
become a partner in the semiconductor venture reshaping the world 
economy, and finally, the pharmaceutical and medical devices sector 
has transformed Mexico into a competitive player in the field of global 
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health economy.  
A. The Auto Industry
In 2015, Mexico produced 3.4 million motor vehicles and occupied 
7th place among vehicle manufacturers globally. This level of output 
was twice that of 2005, when Mexico was the 10th largest producer 
in the world. This surge is the result of large investments made by 
international automotive and auto-parts companies, which reached 
around USD20 billion between 2013 and 2015, according to the 
Ministry of Economy. The global automotive producers’ relocation of 
production facilities to Mexico has been influenced by several factors, 
including the country’s membership in the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), its highly skilled labor force, and the low wages. 
Yet, Mexico’s upswing has not yet reached its end for the country is 
projected to be the world’s 5th largest producer of vehicles by 2020. 
The Federal government has launched a Strategic Program for the 
Automotive Industry 2012–2020, which aims to combine strategies 
and policies to make Mexico one of the top three preferred locations 
worldwide in car assembly and component production. While much 
of this dynamic should come from exports, the government plans to 
broaden the domestic market for vehicles with more technology to 
support the green economy. The value chain developed to date is shown 
in the diagram 1. 
B. The Electronic Sector 
The electronic sector focuses on devices or components that process 
some type of information. This industry is divided into five major 
sub-sectors: audio and video, computer and office, semiconductors, 
communications, and medical equipment and precision, measurement, 
navigation, control and optical instruments. In 2016, Mexico positioned 
itself as the 8th largest electronic producer in the world and 1st in 
Latin America. In 2016, the production of this sector was higher than 
USD77,520 million, contributing 5.3% to the total manufacturing GDP 
and 1.5% to the GDP.
C. The Pharmaceutical Cluster
Industry production is USD14,283 million, with foreign investments 
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of around USD3,172 million. In addition, local consumption is around 
USD17,612 million, exports of the pharmaceutical industry reached 
USD1,847 million, and employment is around 59,650 employees. 
Over the last few years, Mexico has become an attractive destination 
for investments in the pharmaceutical industry due to an improved 
regulatory framework and the increase in quality certifi cations. Some of 
the foreign companies that have established operations in the country 
include Merck Sharp & Dohme, Boehringer Ingelheim, Schering Plough, 
Bayer, AstraZeneca, Pfi zer, and GlaxoSmithKline.
D. The Medical Devices Industry
Mexico is the world’s 8th largest exporter and the US’ main provider 
of medical devices. It is also 1st exporter in Latin America; the 3rd 
exporter of tubular suture needles; the 4th exporter of medical 
furniture, such as stretchers and operating tables; and the 4th exporter 
of needles catheters, cannulas, and other similar instruments. The 
main producers in Mexico, most of which are located in Jalisco, include 
Medtronic, Johnson and Johnson, General Electric, Siemens, Becton 
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DiagraM 2
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Dickinson, Cardinal Health, Philips, and Baxter.
IX. Institutional Framework and the Catch-up Effect
The Mexican experience reflects clearly the middle-income trap 
dilemma in that it is currently the 15th largest economy in the world, 
but is unable to move upwards. The Latin American experience 
demonstrates that, without mechanisms that stimulate competition in 
the protected domestic market, government leadership alone is unable 
to generate sustained productive transformation. 
In the last 30 years, several lessons can be gleaned from the Latin 
American experience. (a) Globalization helps develop comparative 
advantages, but it does not lead to the broad development of more 
value added activities. (b) Securing access to developed country markets 
through trade agreements may lead to greater integration into GVCs, 
but–by itself–does not lead to an upgrade in production. For example, 
as shown in Figure 5, Korea and Malaysia used to be at par with Mexico 
in the 1990s in terms of GDP PPP, now they are dynamic economies 
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that have surpassed the Mexican economy; China, which used to lag 
behind, has now almost caught up with Mexico. (c) Encouraging foreign 
direct investments (FDI) with special incentives and bilateral investment 
treaties may indeed attract more FDI, but per se does not generate 
significant linkages with the rest of the economy or engender technology 
transfer. (d) Finally, domestic innovation capabilities do not develop 
without pro-active government policies at the meso, micro, and macro 
levels.
To avoid being trapped within the middle-income level, the 
development strategy for middle-income countries must focus squarely 
on the promotion of domestic innovation capabilities in a systemic 
way. As Lee et al. (2017) point out in the getting into the “in–out–in 
again hypothesis,” the trend of the FVA of countries would increase 
initially (during the low-income and lower-middle-income stages), and 
then decline at the upper middle-income stage when they attempt to 
create more value-added (relying less on GVC), and finally increase 
at the high-income stage with the enhanced innovation capabilities 
and reintegration into the GVC. The reason is that at the initial stage 
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Figure 5 
Mexico and selected countries: catch-up process (1990–2017)
104 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
industries can learn from the outside. Moreover, functional upgrading 
at the middle stage requires some effort or stages of seeking separation 
and independence from existing foreign-dominated GVCs, and at 
the advanced stage, firms and economies might have to seek further 
opening to integrate back into the GVC after establishing their own local 
value chains. The FVA trends in successful catching-up economies, 
such as Korea, Taiwan, and China, are shown to be consistent with the 
‘‘in–out–in again’’ pattern. 
The implementation of such a strategy also requires a renewed focus 
on active policies for productive transformation, on promoting greater 
innovation in existing sectors, and supporting reallocation towards 
higher productivity sectors. The large heterogeneity in capabilities 
and productivity among domestic firms means that the incorporation 
of knowledge developed elsewhere will continue to be important in 
increasing productivity for many firms and in reducing the large 
productivity gaps among firms. 
Yet, domestic innovation will be more particularly important in 
moving forward. It has to be a collective process, wherein public and 
private actors interact and collaborate, initiatives have to complement 
each other, and the macro and micro incentives have to support 
innovation rather than discourage it. Local firms develop capabilities 
by learning in the production process and through internal R&D efforts 
as well as through interactions with other key actors in the economy, 
namely, other domestic firms, foreign firms, research institutions, and 
universities. The meso and macro contexts have to make learning-by-
doing at the micro level possible. This means that social capabilities 
have to evolve so that firms have the requisite information about 
technology and markets, have access to funding and the needed 
qualified personnel, and the possibilities of collaborating with other 
firms or research entities in the innovation process. Moreover, the 
relative price and support structure has to be such that it makes the 
risk-taking of innovation not only possible, but also necessary.
The pervasiveness of coordination failures, capability failures, and 
market inadequacies, along with the need for non-marginal changes, 
demand a pro-active state for the achievement of broad-based 
upgrading. Horizontal and vertical policies are needed to advance social 
capabilities, support the development of local firm capabilities and 
establish a critical level of absorptive capacity, enable TNC affiliates to 
upgrade production in the host country towards more sophisticated 
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activities, and provide a set of economic incentives that are conducive to 
broad-based capability accumulation. 
(Received 3 July 2018; Revised 12 December 2018; Accepted 30 January 
2019)
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